Abstract. Uncertainty about the persistence of periods characterized by large price shocks is an important aspect of monetary policy. This type of uncertainty posed some difficulties for central banks in 2004. This paper formalizes the treatment of this type of uncertainty by solving an optimal control problem in which the economy randomly alternates between two regimes characterized by different magnitudes of price shocks. By using an open economy model, we find that the optimal policy rule is both regime-contingent and robust. In particular, we find that: a) the optimal reaction of the interest rate is dependent on both the current regime and on the difference in the magnitude of the shocks between regimes; and b) after a robust selection of transition probabilities, the minmax probability of switching to the regime with large price shocks increases when such regime is more harmful. In general, cautious behavior renders smaller losses than recklessness for the monetary authority. This result argues in favor of caution over recklessness in the formulation of monetary policy when there is uncertainty about the persistence of periods with large price shocks.
Introduction
A motivation for the study developed in this paper can be found in the experience of several countries in 2004. This year was marked by increases in international prices of commodities (or primary goods) that affected inflation rates in many economies. Figure 1 shows different indexes of commodity prices in international markets. The shocks to commodities prices were the result of an increase in the global demand for these goods and prompted a cautious behavior of many central banks in the face of increasing rates of inflation throughout the year. 1 Figure 2 presents the annual inflation rates in different regions and countries, which show an increase in 2004. The cautious approach adopted by several monetary authorities in the face of the shocks described above was due to the following reasons: a) the direct impact of higher commodity prices on inflation rates; b) the uncertainty about the evolution of commodity prices in the future; c) the possibility of second round effects of the aforementioned shocks on the process of price formation; and d) the possibility of undesirable effects on inflation derived from the combination of continuing increases in commodity prices and the recovery experienced by the global economy. Walsh (2004) presents some reflections about the concerns faced by central bankers when shocks to inflation are more persistent. After noting that shocks to the inflation rate present central bankers with a trade-off between inflation stabilization and output gap stabilization, he remarks that the problems arising from unexpected shocks become more serious if the shocks are more lasting. Consequently, central bankers who desire a robust policy will react to all inflation shocks as if they were going to be more persistent.
In this paper we try to formalize the treatment of uncertainty about the persistence of shocks to the inflation rate and derive an optimal policy response.
In our framework, the economy randomly alternates between two regimes. The difference between the two regimes is only due to the magnitude of price shocks. A convenient way to model the possibility of sudden changes in the magnitude of shocks results from combining Markov regime-switching and robust control. 6 In such a setting, changing the value of the robust control "free" parameter makes it possible to model different degrees of pessimism or adverse shocks magnitudes (Sargent, 1999, p.152 ).
Higher degrees of pessimism or lower values of the "free" parameter means that the policy maker reacts to shocks as if they were more persistent. In this framework, the policy maker takes into account the possibility that the economy could be switching from the regime with lower-magnitude shocks to the other one and vice versa. As opposed to the model averaging or Bayesian policy maker, as in Milani (2003) , in this work the current regime is observed and there is uncertainty about the shocks magnitude in the next period.
The combination of the Markov switching and robust control techniques is applied to a modified version of the open economy model of Ball (1999) . 7 As it was mentioned above, we assume that the time periods at which the regime with lower-magnitude shocks begins and ends are stochastic, which causes the economy to randomly alternate between periods of relative low and high magnitude shocks. From now on, the regime with highmagnitude shocks will be regime 1 while the other one will be regime 2. The transition probabilities of a Markov chain process determine the evolution of both regimes.
Previous works in the area of robust control (or min-max control) in monetary policy problems are the following. Becker et al. (1994) produce an algorithm for robust optimal decisions with stochastic nonlinear models applied to the United Kingdom The robust control problem used here is like the one proposed by Hansen and Sargent (2003) and Söderström (1999) . They specify a broad, nonparametric set of additive model perturbations that represent deviations of the model actually used from the true model, and bound uncertainty in terms of a bound upon the possible size of this additive term. In this venue, Stock (1999) , Onatski and Stock (2002) , and Giannoni (2002) The combination of Markov regime-switching and robust control presented in this paper delivers the following general results: a) the resulting optimal policy rule is both regime-contingent and robust; b) the optimal reaction of the interest rate is dependent on both the actual regime and on the difference in the magnitude of shocks between regimes; c) unlike the results in Zampolli (2004) and Blake and Zampolli (2004) for regime shifts affecting the structural parameters, the alternation between regimes with different shocks leads to more aggressive policy reactions with respect to inflation and the second lag of the real exchange rate; 8 and d) after a robust selection of transition probabilities, the min-max probability of switching to the regime with large price shocks depends on its harmfulness --i.e. the more harmful is the regime, the higher the min-max probability of switching.
In the next section, we describe the optimal control problem with unstructured regime shifts. Section 3 shows the procedure to compute the steady state solution to the problem with Markov regime-switching and robust control combined. Section 4 describes the modified version of the small open economy model of Ball (1999) we used. Section 5 applies the solution obtained in Section 3 to the model described in Section 4. Section 6 presents the solution to the problem we pose and shows the robust selection of transition probabilities. Section 7 contains the conclusions. 
The optimal control problem with unstructured regime shifts
To solve the policy maker's problem, we set up a Quadratic Linear Problem (QLP) with a n x 1 vector of states, m x 1 vector of control variables, discounting and robust control. The unstructured regime shifts are derived from changing the value of the robust control "free" 
Thus p is the probability that high-magnitude shocks become low-magnitude and q is the probability that low-magnitude shocks become high-magnitude. These probabilities represent the uncertainty about the size of shocks in the next period and the persistence of each regime. The regime of the economy 1 k r + is assumed to be revealed only towards the end of period k , after the policy action has been decided. That is, the policy maker chooses a policy when k r is known but 1 + k r is not.
Since the Riccati equations for the QLP result from first-order conditions and the the first-order conditions for extremizing a quadratic criterion function match those of an ordinary (non-robust) QLP with two controls (see Hansen and Sargent, 2003, pp. 29-30) , the optimal control problem with unstructured regime shifts can be written as: 9
in order to extremize the following expression: The extremization is subject to the system equations
where = A matrix of coefficients for state variables, = B matrix of coefficients for control variables.
Steady state solution to the optimal control problem with unstructured regime shifts
Solving the optimal control problem with unstructured regime shifts is equivalent to finding a steady state contingent policy rule ss r u . That is, the optimal rule is a function of the current regime and the corresponding steady state values of the state variables.
By adapting the solution in Kendrick (1981, p. 17) to the case of regime-switching with two regimes, the steady state contingent policy rules are found to be given by: 
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Unstructured regime shifts in an open economy model
The combination of Markov switching and robust control is applied to a modified version of the model of Ball (1999) . The nominal interest rate k i is the only control variable used by the policy maker. In the policy maker's loss function, the nominal interest rate deviations with respect to its previous lagged value, inflation and output gap deviations from their long run targets are penalized. 11 The model consists of three equations:
10 In these equations, the vectors 1 C and 2 C represent vector of constants obtained when there are forward looking variables that become part of the vector of constants when one uses the Fair and Taylor (1983) procedure to solve models with forward-looking variables. Equation (17) − . This sum is equivalent to the nominal depreciation of the exchange rate plus the external inflation, both lagged one period and expressed in percentage points, since ln
where k E is the nominal exchange rate, US k P is the headline price index in the US and k P is the domestic headline price level . Equation respectively. In our case, only the Phillips curve will be subject to unstructured regimeswitching when adding the term
In order to solve an optimal control problem as the one defined by equations (1)-(4), the system equations (17)-(19) must be in the form of first-difference equations. The system equations (17)-(19) can be expressed in matrix form as first difference equations as follows: 12 
Equations (17), (18) and (19) were estimated using data for the Mexican economy under the assumption of perfect foresight or 1 1 e k k π π + + = for all k . We used monthly data for the headline inflation, the output gap, the real exchange rate and the ex-ante real interest rate from a sample that begins at January 2000 and ends at November 2004. 13 The model described by the system equations (17)- (19) posed the case of econometric models with simultaneous equations. Hence, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator was used to find 12 See chapter 2 in Kendrick (1981) to convert second-order or higher-order difference equations into first order difference equations. the parameters of the model. In the first stage the parameters of Equation (18) were estimated. In the second stage, the values of the fitted inflation replaced actual inflation in
Equations (17) and (19) and the rest of the parameters were estimated. The estimation results and other parameter values used are shown in the Table I . The note on Table I contains the penalty weights values used in the loss function. In other words, losses are only due to both deviations of inflation and output gap from their targets and those coming from interest rate first differences. is the penalty weight on interest rate deviations from its previous lagged value. The Hausman test statistic for endogeneity was calculated for each equation and only for the IS equation the null hypothesis was rejected. . .
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Robust selection of transition probabilities by the monetary authority
The approach used here to deal with the Knightian or unmeasurable uncertainty faced by the policy maker is the one proposed by Zampolli (2004) . He analyzes how the policy rules derived when the policy maker chooses a transition probability q affect her loss under true transition probabilities q , and finds the min-max transition probability. Losses are normalized with respect to ( , )= (0,0).
Measuring the losses resulting from recklessness and caution is an interesting experiment. Recklessness losses result when the regime with high-magnitude shocks occurs but it is not considered in the policy making decision. On the other hand, caution losses occur when the policymaking takes into account the regime with high-magnitude shocks but it never occurs.
Charts 1-6 show the optimal and recklessness losses for all ( , )pairs and different values of p . The transition probabilities chosen by the policymaker are on the x-axis and the normalized losses on the y-axis.
As it can be seen from Charts 1, 3 and 5, the losses corresponding to low true transition probabilities q increase as the probability chosen by the policymaker q increases. On the other hand, the losses corresponding to high true probability transition values q decrease when the chosen transition probability q increases. Consequently, a common level of the policymaker's loss can be found. This value corresponds to the minmax transition probability q that the policymaker should select. Charts 1, 3 and 5 show that for q in the neighborhood of 0.6, the min-max probability is robust in the sense that it delivers equal losses regardless of the true transition probability q .
Charts 2, 4 and 6 show that recklessness losses are horizontal for each q since the policy maker ignores the possibility of switching to the regime with large price shocks.
Also, these charts show that recklessness losses increase with lower values of p -i.e. reckless behavior is more costly when more time periods are spent in the regime characterized by larger shocks.
Charts 8, 10 and 12 exhibit the caution losses. It can be observed that being more prepared for the possibility of transition (choosing higher values of q ) is more costly for low true probability transition values q , if the regime with large price shocks never occurs.
Also, in Charts 7-12, it is clear that recklessness is more costly than being cautious for most ( , )pairs.
in the formulation of monetary policy when there is uncertainty about the persistence of periods with large price shocks.
Not surprisingly, both the recklessness and caution losses increase with the true probability q . Moreover, being more cautious, as suggested by higher values of q , is more costly for lower values of q -i.e. the slope is steeper.
The shocks magnitude plays a role in selecting robust transition probabilities. The higher the difference in magnitude, the higher the chosen probability q . Charts 13 and 14
show this result. The lower value of the "free" parameter θ on Chart 14 implies a more adverse regime with large price shocks than the one for 6.5 θ = on Chart 13. Hence, the policy maker should increase the min-max probability of switching when regime 1 is more harmful.
Chart 13. Optimal losses for 6.5 θ = Chart 14. Optimal losses for 4.6 θ =
Conclusions
This paper presents an algorithm for solving an optimal control problem in which the economy randomly alternates between two regimes characterized by different price shocks magnitudes. The algorithm is applied to obtain the optimal monetary policy rule in an open economy model in which the alternation between regimes is introduced by means of the "free" parameter commonly used when modeling unstructured uncertainty.
We find that the resulting optimal policy rule is both regime-contingent and robust.
Specifically, we find the following results: a) the optimal reaction of the interest rate is dependent on both the actual regime and on the difference in the magnitude of shocks between regimes; and b) after a robust selection of transition probabilities, the min-max probability of switching to the regime with large price shocks increases when this regime is more harmful.
For most cases, cautious behavior delivers smaller losses for the policymaker than recklessness. Hence, these results argue in favor of caution over recklessness in the formulation of monetary policy when there is uncertainty about the transition to a regime characterized by large price shocks.
